First published in 1980, this book presents an important critique of prevailing political doctrine in Western societies at a time of major change in circumstances of Western civilization. G. Lowell Field and John Higley stress the importance of a more realistic appraisal of elite and mass roles in politics, arguing that political stability and any real degree of representative democracy depend fundamentally on the existence of specific kinds of elites.

Structural needs for immigrant labor in health care, restaurant, tourism, agricultural and other economic sectors, together with harsher economic circumstances in most sending countries, almost certainly ensure the continuation of large-scale immigration to the US and Australia. But in harder times, especially in the US, sustaining this immigration while managing immigrants' economic and social integration are daunting tasks. This illuminating book analyzes how well, and in what ways, the US and Australia will meet these challenges. This companion volume to Nations of Immigrants examines immigration to the US and Australia during the difficult economic times following the paralysis of financial firms and markets in New York and London in autumn 2008, quickly affecting Australia and most other OECD countries. The contributors - prominent American and Australian immigration specialists - discuss how the financial crisis has altered the nexus of domestic labor markets and immigration, how public fears spurred by harder times are affecting border protection and support for immigration, whether serious abrasions between foreign- and native-born populations are resulting, and the extent to which the politics of immigration is being transformed. Immigration and the Financial Crisis will prove a thought provoking read for academics and students with an interest in immigration, and American and Australian policy arenas. The book will also prove an invaluable reference tool for public servants engaged in administering US and Australian immigration policies.

Bold political elites and unique forms of social order brought the West to world dominance, but both are weakening dramatically in the contemporary period. The Endangered West makes the case for the continuation of Western power on as wide a global basis as is prudent. Is the survival of Western influence possible, or must we resign ourselves to its eventually being subordinated to more ruthless powers? Higley lays out the main policy lines that successful leadership will have to follow to preserve and strengthen Western societies. These include avoiding futile involvements in the internal problems of non-Western countries and preserving sufficient social order to permit public and private organizations to function. The West will also have to find a way to regularize treatment of the growing number of those who lack employment; invent new forms of useful work for Westerners to perform; inhibit large in-migrations, and discourage population growth. Above all, the West must address the threat of environmental disaster. There is no certain result in the struggle, but such measures will help to prevent a slide into despotism or a lapse into barbarism. Half the battle is to hold on to what the West has and, if possible, extend it. Progress will be made if elites and opinion leaders address societies' problems more competently. If the West's prestige is restored, world tensions may gradually subside, making meeting global problems more possible.

Bold political elites and unique forms of social order brought the West to world dominance, but both are weakening dramatically in the contemporary period. The Endangered West makes the case for the continuation of Western power on as wide a global basis as is prudent. Is the survival of Western influence possible, or must we resign ourselves to its eventually being subordinated to more ruthless powers? Higley lays out the main policy lines that successful leadership will have to follow to preserve and strengthen Western societies. These include avoiding futile involvements in the internal problems of non-Western countries and preserving sufficient social order to permit public and private organizations to function. The West will also have to find a way to regularize treatment of the growing number of those who lack employment; invent new forms of useful work for Westerners to perform; inhibit large in-migrations, and discourage population growth. Above all, the West must address the threat of environmental disaster. There is no certain result in the struggle, but such measures will help to prevent a slide into despotism or a lapse into barbarism. Half the battle is to hold on to what the West has and, if possible, extend it. Progress will be made if elites and opinion leaders address societies' problems more competently. If the West's prestige is restored, world tensions may gradually subside, making meeting global problems more possible.

First published in 1980, this book presents an important critique of prevailing political doctrine in Western societies at a time of major change in circumstances of Western civilization. G. Lowell Field and John Higley stress the importance of a more realistic appraisal of elite and mass roles in politics, arguing that political stability and any real degree of representative democracy depend fundamentally on the existence of specific kinds of elites.

A distinguished group of scholars examine recent transitions to democracy and the prospects for democratic stability in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Portugal, Spain and Uruguay. They also assess the role of elites in the longer-established democratic regimes in Columbia, Costa Rica, Italy, Mexico and Venezuela. The authors conclude that in independent states with long records of political instability and authoritarian rule, democratic consolidation requires the achievement of elite 'consensual unity' - that is, agreement among all politically important elites on the worth of existing democratic institutions and respect for democratic rules-of-the-game, coupled with increased 'structural integration' among those elites. Two processes by which consensual unity can be established are explored - elite settlement, the negotiating of compromises on basic disagreements, and elite convergence, a more subtle series of tactical decisions by rival elites which have cumulative effect, over perhaps a generation.

A distinguished group of scholars examine recent transitions to democracy and the prospects for democratic stability in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Portugal, Spain and Uruguay. They also assess the role of elites in the longer-established democratic regimes in Columbia, Costa Rica, Italy, Mexico and Venezuela. The authors conclude that in independent states with long records of political instability and authoritarian rule, democratic consolidation requires the achievement of elite 'consensual unity' - that is, agreement among all politically important elites on the worth of existing democratic institutions and respect for democratic rules-of-the-game, coupled with increased 'structural integration' among those elites. Two processes by which consensual unity can be established are explored - elite settlement, the negotiating of compromises on basic disagreements, and elite convergence, a more subtle series of tactical decisions by rival elites which have cumulative effect, over perhaps a generation.

This timely book examines the immense surges in immigration since the mid-1990s in Australia and the United States, two of the world's most important settler-receiving countries. Australia's shift to a points-based, skills-oriented system is contrasted with the political deadlock that has prevented any basic change in US immigration policy during this period. Focusing on immigration policy trends, effects on labour markets, successes and failures in integrating massive numbers of new immigrants, and the future of multiculturalism, the book ponders many of the policy dilemmas that confront both countries. Drawing on extensive research findings in the field of immigration policy, this book will prove a fascinating read for both scholars and postgraduate students working on immigration, as well as undergraduates studying courses on Australia and comparisons of the Australian and American policy arenas. Public servants engaged in administering Australian and US immigration policies will also find this book invaluable.

This handbook presents a comprehensive view of the current theory and research surrounding political elites, which is now a pivotal subject for academic study and public discourse. In 40 chapters by leading scholars, it displays the field's richness and diversity. The handbook is organized in six sections, each introduced by a co-editor, focusing on theories about political elites, methods for studying them, their main structural and behavioral patterns worldwide, the differentiation and integration of political elite sectors, elite attributes and resources, and the dilemmas of political elites in this century. Forty years since Robert Putnam's landmark Comparative Study of Political Elites, this handbook is an indispensable resource for scholars and students engaged in the study of this vibrant field.

Changing configurations of national elites are shaping the prospects for democracy in the countries of postcommunist Eastern Europe. In several countries (Serbia, Bulgaria, Russia) there are unchecked power struggles between elites, with regimes oscillating between democratic and authoritarian tendencies. In other countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) restrained elite competitions are being institutionalized and are leading to stable democratic regimes. These and other outcomes are analyzed for the region as a whole.

This provocative and groundbreaking book challenges accepted wisdom about the role of elites in both maintaining and undermining democracy in an increasingly authoritarian world. John Higley traces patterns of elite political behavior and the political orientations of non-elite populations throughout modern history to show what is and is not possible in contemporary politics. He situates these patterns and orientations in a range of regimes, showing how they have played out in revolutions, populist nationalism, Arab Spring failures to democratize, the conflation of ultimate and instrumental values in today's liberal democracies, and American political thinkers' misguided assumption that non-elites are the principal determinants of politics. Critiquing the optimistic outlooks prevalent among educated Westerners, Higley considers them out of touch with reality because of spreading employment insecurity, demoralization, and millennial pursuits in their societies. Attacks by domestic and foreign terrorists, effects of climate change, mass migrations from countries outside the West, and disease pandemics exacerbate insecurity and further highlight the flaws in the belief that democracy can thrive and spread worldwide. Higley concludes that these threats to the well-being of Western societies are here to stay. They leave elites with no realistic alternative to a holding operation until at least mid-century that husbands the power and political practices of Western societies. Drawing on decades of research, Higley's analysis is historically and comparatively informed, bold, and in some places dark-and will be sure to foster debate.

This provocative and groundbreaking book challenges accepted wisdom about the role of elites in both maintaining and undermining democracy in an increasingly authoritarian world. John Higley traces patterns of elite political behavior and the political orientations of non-elite populations throughout modern history to show what is and is not possible in contemporary politics. He situates these patterns and orientations in a range of regimes, showing how they have played out in revolutions, populist nationalism, Arab Spring failures to democratize, the conflation of ultimate and instrumental values in today's liberal democracies, and American political thinkers' misguided assumption that non-elites are the principal determinants of politics. Critiquing the optimistic outlooks prevalent among educated Westerners, Higley considers them out of touch with reality because of spreading employment insecurity, demoralization, and millennial pursuits in their societies. Attacks by domestic and foreign terrorists, effects of climate change, mass migrations from countries outside the West, and disease pandemics exacerbate insecurity and further highlight the flaws in the belief that democracy can thrive and spread worldwide. Higley concludes that these threats to the well-being of Western societies are here to stay. They leave elites with no realistic alternative to a holding operation until at least mid-century that husbands the power and political practices of Western societies. Drawing on decades of research, Higley's analysis is historically and comparatively informed, bold, and in some places dark-and will be sure to foster debate.

This compelling and convincing study represents the culmination of the authors' several decades of research on the pivotal role played by elites in the success or failure of political regimes. Revising the classical theory of elites and politics, John Higley and Michael Burton distinguish basic types of elites and associated political regimes. They canvas political change during the modern historical and contemporary periods to identify circumstances and ways in which the sine qua non of liberal democracy, a consensually united elite, has formed and persisted. The book considers an impressive body of cases, examining how consensually united elites have fostered forty-five liberal democracies and how disunited or ideologically united elites have thus far prevented liberal democracy in more than one hundred other countries. The authors argue that obstacles to the emergence of elites propitious for liberal democracy are more formidable than democratization enthusiasts recognize. They assess prospects for the transformation of disunited and ideologically united elites where they now exist, ask whether current challenges to Western liberal democracies will undermine their consensually united elites, and explore what the rise of the distinctive elite clustered around George W. Bush may portend for America's liberal democracy. The authors' powerful and important argument reframes our thinking about liberal democracy and questions optimistic assumptions about the prospects for its spread in the twenty-first century.

This compelling and convincing study represents the culmination of the authors' several decades of research on the pivotal role played by elites in the success or failure of political regimes. Revising the classical theory of elites and politics, John Higley and Michael Burton distinguish basic types of elites and associated political regimes. They canvas political change during the modern historical and contemporary periods to identify circumstances and ways in which the sine qua non of liberal democracy, a consensually united elite, has formed and persisted. The book considers an impressive body of cases, examining how consensually united elites have fostered forty-five liberal democracies and how disunited or ideologically united elites have thus far prevented liberal democracy in more than one hundred other countries. The authors argue that obstacles to the emergence of elites propitious for liberal democracy are more formidable than democratization enthusiasts recognize. They assess prospects for the transformation of disunited and ideologically united elites where they now exist, ask whether current challenges to Western liberal democracies will undermine their consensually united elites, and explore what the rise of the distinctive elite clustered around George W. Bush may portend for America's liberal democracy. The authors' powerful and important argument reframes our thinking about liberal democracy and questions optimistic assumptions about the prospects for its spread in the twenty-first century.

This distinctive book presents valuable new research on the political and economic elites that have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe since the demise of state socialism. Integrating theoretically informed analysis with fresh empirical data, the contributors significantly enhance our understanding of the evolution and interplay of elites in the post-communist period. Leading experts explore the elite circulations, differentiations, and competitions that now underpin but in some countries also still inhibit democratic stability and economic growth. A provocative concluding chapter assesses the century-long confrontation between elite theory and Marxism and where they stand today, after state socialismOs collapse.

Exploring the controversies and problems surrounding post-communist transitions, this innovative volume brings together a distinguished group of political scientists, economists, historians, and sociologists. Within a strong theoretical framework, the book moves between general issues of transitology and specific analyses. Hungary, a state that has weathered political and economic transition more successfully than most, is used as the volume's case study for illuminating both comparative and regional issues. By bridging the divide between area studies and comparative politics, this book will be a key resource for advanced students and for scholars in East-European/post-communist studies, comparative politics, and international relations.

Most political regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, are born in abrupt, brutal, and momentous crises. In this volume, a group of prominent scholars explores how these seminal events affect elites and shape regimes. Combining theoretical and case study chapters, the authors draw from a wide range of historical and contemporary examples to challenge mainstream developmental explanations of political change, which emphasize incremental changes and evolutions stretching over generations. Instead, the authors argue here, political leaders and elites possess significant autonomy and latitude for maneuver, especially in times of crisis. Elites' choices are frequently decisive in the making of regimes and the forging of national political histories. Providing a sustained comparative analysis of elites, their circulation, and behavior across times and countries, this lucid volume will be invaluable for scholars and students alike.

Bei keinem Eliten-Theoretiker wurde bisher die eigene privilegierte Position be- rucksichtigt und gefragt, unterwelchen wirtschaftlichen Umstanden welche Form von Elite den gewunschten Standard des gesamten gesellschaftlichen Lebens - Recht, Freiheit, Meinungsfreiheit eingeschlossen - erst ermoglicht. Die Autoren der hier ubersetzt vorliegenden Studie "Elitism", G. Lowell Field, Emeritus an der University of Connecticut, undJohn Higley von der Australian National Uni- versity, Canberra, leiten ihre Arbeit mit der Feststellung ihrer Privilegiertheit als gutbesoldete Sozialwissenschaftler ein, einem "Besitzstand", den sie beizubehal- ten wunschen. Und sie fragen ohne jede ideologische Verbramung nach den histo- risch-gesellschaftlichen Mechanismen, die ein solches Leben ermoglichen, - ein Leben in Freiheit und mit der Freiheit, sich diejenigen interessanten Menschen aussuchen zu konnen, mit denen man Kontakt haben mochte: "Well situated, well educated, well off . . . " Diese Untersuchung erscheint mir deshalb so wichtig, weil sie - unabhangig davon, ob uns ihre inhaltlichen Aussagen gefallen - unbestechlich aufklarend ist. Sie erweitert das Blickfeld, informiert uber Zusammenhange, lalh uns unsere Si- tuation (vielleicht gegen unseren Willen als Leser) besser verstehen, stellt Fragen, die wir beantworten muss en, wenn wir so, wie wir es wunschen, uberleben wol- len, gibt Antworten, die uns nicht gefallen mogen, - aber dann muss en wir andere begrundete Antworten parat haben, und hier liegt die PrUfung. In dies em Buch ist kein Raum fur Verdrangung unliebsamer Einsichten.

For years the prevailing view among scholars has been that postcolonial Australia is "an undifferentiated composite of Anglo-Celtic culture," in which English, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish components quickly fused into a singular culture. But based on extensive field research, this study questions that view: the authors' compilation of data from 13,271 tombstones revealing the birth place of the interred, from 565 graveyards throughout Australia, shows "point-to-point and shire-to-shire migration from the British Isles to Australia." As a result, they also uncover Australia's distinct regional clusters of specific groups from the British Isles--and the differences of religion, dialect, urbanization, and agriculture that accompany them.